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Resumo
Com o fim da Guerra Fria, a região mediterrânica
tornou-se mais importante para a OTAN como
um todo e não apenas para os países do flanco
sul. As razões principais são óbvias: os riscos e
os desafios moveram-se para o sul; surgiu a
crise nos Balcãs; a UE iniciou o processo de
Barcelona; há países do sul que enfrentam tran-
sições políticas difíceis: existe a disputa Gre-
co-Turca sobre o Egeu e Chipre e, sobretudo o
confronto Israelo-Palestiniano; as ameaças do
terrorismo e das AMD pairam sobre a região,
aumentando a incerteza histórica da região.
Uma política resoluta de segurança necessita de
fundamentos políticos muito firmes uma ban-
deira facilmente identificável: as políticas de
segurança e defesa são planeadas para promo-
ver a confiança, para construir a paz, e para
conseguir a segurança através da cooperação;
o conflito é o preço a pagar pelo falhanço des-
tas políticas. Como fortalecer as medidas de
criação de confiança (CBM’s) no ambiente medi-
terrânico? A OTAN promove um diálogo com os
países mediterrânicos do sul, inspirado pelos
princípios do Tratado fundador. Reiterar esses
princípios dentro das novas e específicas circuns-
tâncias do Mediterrâneo é a melhor garantia
que serão propostas e executadas as políticas de
segurança mais adequadas.
Abstract
With the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean
region became more important for NATO as a whole
and not just for the Southern countries. The main
reasons are obvious: risks and challenges moved
south; the Balkan crisis erupted; the EU became
increasingly more involved through the Barcelona
process; the proliferation of WMD threatens the
region; several Southern Mediterranean countries
face difficult political transitions: the Greek-Turkish
dispute over the Aegean and Cyprus and the
Israeli-Palestine confrontation; threats of terrorism
loom over the region, adding to the sense of
uncertainty fostered by history.
A resolute security policy needs a common political
ground and an easily identifiable flag to fight for:
defence and security policies are devised to foster
confidence, to build prospects of peace, and to achieve
security through cooperation; war is the outcome of
the failure of such policies. How to strengthen
confidence-building measures (CBM’s) within the
Mediterranean environment? As NATO embarks
upon a dialogue with other Mediterranean countries,
the nature and content of this policy should be
inspired by the original Treaty’s guidelines. To
reiterate “the principles of democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of law” as preconditions to
security is the best guarantee that adequate policies
will be implemented.
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* This article is a version of my communication Natural Law as a precondition for security in the Mediterranean, at the
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1. “Middle Earth”
Middle Earth should be the name for the Mediterranean region. Nowhere in our
planet, is there such a diversity of climate, resources, population, language, culture
and religion, nor such a troubled history or such a potential future. The Mediterranean
history is a living proof that geography does not determine our destiny: it tells us that
nowhere else is so much political acumen needed nor do we find such outstanding
leaders confronting such complex situations. Dealing or dialogue was never easy in
such a complex environment in terms of space and time1.
Geographically, the Mediterranean has at least four different regions: Southern
Europe, the Balkans, the Near East and the Mahgreb. Historically, there is a process of
multiple modernities2, to which we are awakened by the difference between Western
and Muslim chronologies. In economic terms, North is more developed and South is
chronically underdeveloped, the latter faring badly in most socio-economic indicators3.
In political terms, there are very different individual styles of life, embedded in
diverse societies and ruled by different states.
With the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean region became more important
for NATO as a whole and not just for the Southern countries. The main reasons are
obvious: risks and challenges moved south; the Balkan crisis erupted; the EU became
increasingly more involved through the Barcelona process; the proliferation of WMD
threatens the region; several Southern Mediterranean countries face difficult political
transitions: the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean and Cyprus and the Israeli-Palestine
confrontation; threats of terrorism loom over the region, adding to the sense of uncertainty
fostered by history.
A resolute security policy needs a common political ground and an easily identifiable
flag to fight for: policies are devised to foster confidence, to build prospects of peace, and
to achieve security through cooperation; war is the outcome of the failure of such policies.
1 Richard Gillespie, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Islamists, in R. Gillespie (ed.), Mediterranean Politics,
Vol. II, London, Printer, 1996. For Geopolitics as a regional frame for deliberation, see Zaki Laïdi (sous la
dir. de), Géopolitique du sens, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1998. A classical study Ferdinand Braudel (1964),
The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the reign of Philip II, (2 vols.) Fontana Books.
2 Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, Jerusalem, 1985. Most interesting is Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities
of the Middle East, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998.
3 Asli Guveli, Serdar Kilickaplan, “A Ranking of Islamic Countries in Terms of Their Levels of Socio-Economic
Development”, Journal of Economic Cooperation 21, no. 1 (2000): 97-114, A3: Socio-Economic Development
List.
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How to strengthen confidence building measures (CBM’s) within the Mediterranean
environment?
A set of preconditions must be fulfilled before embarking on specific CBM’s.
NATO did just that in its 1949 Founding Treaty, with “the principles of democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law”4. The principles exposed in the Preamble
and Articles 1 and 2 of the NATO Treaty, provide a common stance regarding the
intertwining of internal politics and international relations. They are conceived to
settle any international dispute in such a manner that “international peace and security
and justice be not endangered”, and vowing not to be “inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations”. NATO is an obvious beacon to new members and an inspiration
to whatever partnership it may enter upon, as the Partnership for Peace shows since
1992, and as the Mediterranean Initiative may evolve.
NATO’s high-sounding principles won the Cold War. They may now have receded
into the background, as the organization became bigger than the concept, and immediate
threats were substituted by diffused risks. Precisely, as international relationships are
never rigid, principles do matter and pacta sunt servanda 5. As NATO embarks upon a
dialogue with other Mediterranean countries, the nature and content of this policy should
be inspired by the original Treaty’s guidelines. To reiterate them is the best guarantee that
adequate policies will be implemented.
Crystal-clear principles do matter but they are to be implemented within specific
cultural, economical, and social objectives; they are not a blueprint starting from “ground
zero” and directed to the “end of history”. Principles must be adapted through compromise;
if not the case, they turn to be inconsequent and merely vague ideological concepts.
More than any other security initiative, the Mediterranean dialogue requires a
bold shift from current political Western paradigms. National interest is not the
paradigm for international relations; if such were the case, international relations would
become a province of globalization6; the inter-state pyramid of powers would impose
4 Preamble to The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949: “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to
promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for
collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security”.
5 De Leonardis, Massimo, (a cura di) La nuova NATO: i membri, le strutture, i compiti, Bolgna, Il Mulino,
2001.
6 Waters, Malcolm. 1995. Globalization, London and New York: Routledge. xiv+185pp.
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on relations among nations; non-state organizations and individuals would be
brushed aside; the Hobbes paradigm that “society enchains man” and “the state gives
him back his rights” is followed by the Clausewitz paradigm, “war is the continuation
of politics by other means”7; by “any means”, according to contemporary terrorist
movements8.
In contrast, the most powerful NATO message – despite Western divisionism,
its inefective message to the rest of the world and its unfair reception by part of it – is
that a citizen’s community must be built “according to the rule of law” and that “war is
the failure of politics”.
2. Recent Security Initiatives in the Mediterranean
Cooperation between Mediterranean partners must be of multi-religious,
multicultural and multi-economical nature; it must be embedded in an ongoing process
of modernization in the Southern Mediterranean and a post-modern process of integration
in the European Union. The complexity of such cooperation requires the adherence to
strict principles and an unyielding agenda, as multilateral approaches are prone to lack
of leadership and practicality. NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, launched in 1994,
recognised the rising magnitude of security challenges in the region, namely the emergent
risks in the Muslim world.
The modernization and democratisation of the Muslim world is a multidimensional
process at local, national, and international levels. We must bear in mind the centuries-long
Western road to modernization.
The approach to modernization in the Muslim world engages: a) a variety of regional
states; b) a variety of shared norms, rules and institutions; and c) a variety of individuals
and social identities.The Mediterranean Muslim world has to cope with huge problems
which Europe, following the theoretical precepts of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant, answered
with state-building, international relations and civil society. Modernization is not a linear
process modelled upon voluntaristic efforts. In most cases, this approach failed in the last
50 years. Ad hoc plans of socialist transformation has not encouraged democratisation and
7 The modern metaphor that imposes a virtual “state of society” upon a virtual “state of nature” is studied
by Hans Blumenberg in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 1985 The MIT Press, 728 pages.
8 See Alain Joxe, L’empire du chaos. Les Républiques face à la domination américaine dans l’après-guerre
froide, Paris, La Découverte, 2004 (1st ed.2002).
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has impelled the desperately violent reactions of Muslim radicals such as Salafists and
Wahhabists9.
Taking into account this panorama, different European international organizations
have undertaken a dialogue with their neighbours in the South since the end of Cold War.
In October 1990, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal (C4) met in Rome with Algeria,
Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania and launched the “5+5 Initiative”, (Malta was later
added); they approved a declaration on dialogue and cooperation in the Western Mediterranean
with the principles of globality as a basis for a dialogue on security in the region.
A Conference of Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) that applied
the procedures of OSCE in Eastern and Central Europe was planned and three areas of
work were established – security, economic cooperation and human rights – adding other
EU members, the Balkan States, Ukraine, Russia, the United States, the Mahgreb and Near
East. Nevertheless, the diversity and the outbreak of the Gulf War prevented new
developments.
The European Union launched the so called Barcelona Process and its Euromediterranean
Association project in November 1995, with the fifteen countries of EU and twelve (then)
non-community Mediterranean States: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Malta, Morocco, Mauritania, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, in addition to the National
Authority Palestine. The project went on with three baskets: security, economy and social
policy. The process continued in Malta in April 1997, with the celebration of the II
Euromediterranean Conference. A trend was set: while the countries of the Southern shore
put the emphasis in economic development, the European governments emphasized the
political aspects and security. Moreover, the usual north-south tension within the EU
manifested itself in the northern members’ preference for a Mediterranean policy based on
trade concessions; the southern members emphasised the need for financial aid. This
scenario was set with strong risks for instability in the North-South Mediterranean
relationship10.
The Western European Union (WEU) and the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) favored other
approaches to deal with the question of security from a political-military perspective. The
9 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What
to do”, Millennium, vol.30, n.1, pp. 19-39.
10 “The European Union’s Relations with the Mediterranean” , European Commission Memorandum 94/74,
December 1994; European Commission, “The Barcelona Conference and the Euro-Mediterranean Association
Agreements,” European Commission Information Memorandum, 23 November 1995; Solana, Javier, “NATO
and the Mediterranean” , Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring, 1997, pp. 11-20.
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WEU, in the Ministerial Council of Petersberg of June of 1992, gave green light to open a
process of dialogue with the countries of North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and
Tunisia). After the Ministerial Council of Kirchberg of 1994, two types of meetings were
structured to foster confidence. Inside WEU, by joint proposal of France, Italy, Portugal
and Spain, (C4) Eurofor and Euromarfor were specifically asked not to act in the
Mediterranean. From 1992 onwards, the WEU dialogue gradually involved six southern
Mediterranean partners until 2000, when the WEU became absorbed in the EU11.
The Atlantic Alliance began its dialogue with the “Southern Flank” countries during
the EU summit of Brussels in 1994. Since then, it has established contacts with Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. The so-called Mediterranean Dialogue of NATO
has been developed in two levels of meetings. In the Madrid Summit of July 97, the
Mediterranean Dialogue was one of the high-priority objectives of the Alliance; policies for
the sharing of information and encouragement of mutual confidence were proposed. This
was confirmed in the Washington Summit of April 199912.
NATO is evolving and transforming itself from a defence alliance to a defence and
security alliance. On the other hand, Southern Mediterranean countries have also developed
clusters of initiatives of their own, such as the frequent meetings of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of Islamic countries.
3. Assessment of Trends
The Barcelona Process has so far established socio-economic objectives for the
Mediterranean dialogue. Yet, its soft security objectives are not clear. This should be taken
into account when seeking a new paradigm for a NATO-Mediterranean security partnership.
Before starting a dialogue with almost the same participants, albeit under a different
framework, many obstacles need to be addressed.
After the approval of the European Constitutional Treaty, security became a
transversal issue and the European Security and Defence Policy is now an integral part of
the common foreign policy of the EU. The mechanisms chosen to address the Euro-
11 Vasconcelos, Alvaro, Européens et Maghrébins, Editions KARTHALA, Paris, 1993.
12 NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: policy issues and dilemmas, (ed. F. Stephen Larrabee) National Security
Research Division, Rand Publications, 1998; Moya, Pedro, Cooperation for Security in the Mediterranean:
NATO and EU Contributions, Subcommittee on the Mediterranean Basin, North Atlantic Assembly, May
1996.
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-Mediterranean issues reflect the technicalities forced upon European policy-makers by
the very nature of a union of sovereign states; EU issues are fundamentally different
from the security and defence policy of a nation-state. There are tensions within the
EU between national sovereignty and collective action – most obviously manifest in
the relative weakness of Europe’s common foreign and security policy; an European
regional policy can only operate at the level of the lowest common denominator
acceptable to member states.
European countries want an increased commitment by Southern Mediterranean
countries to build democracy through state and civil society initiatives. Given the desire
of Southern Mediterranean states to expand the Barcelona Process, as far as non-European
Union member countries in the Mediterranean basin are concerned, this becomes an
area of opportunity.
Cultural change is an integral part of this process through influences spread by
cinema, radio, satellite television and Internet. All such media stimulate attempts to
emulate and to exclude. Europe excludes migrants but exports goods and services.
Denial of access by Europe builds a determination to reject from the South; the encouragment
of material satisfaction but the denial of access to the Northern countries generates a
moral rejection and political opposition in the Southern countries. A scenario is set
for the opposition between the West and Islam13.
Mediterranean Muslim countries, yet, are conducting the debates of any modern
society: production and division of resources; individual freedom and obligation to
community; the nature of a just society. The debate process is not easy. There are mutual
suggestions and accusations about the role of the people, of social groups and of intellectuals
in politics. Frustrated inhabitants take religion as a substitute for social and cultural
aspirations. Political and social rights do not accompany literacy. Populism becomes
the pattern of the relationship between leaders and society. Modernization is not
accompanied by democratisation. The fundamentalists’ violent reactions plague the
political will to adapt Islam to new historical conditions14.
Every political issue is a subject of controversy between authoritarian defenders of
status quo, secular modernists, fundamentalists and religious reformists. Radical
fundamentalists, like Salafists or Wahhabists, try to cover the internal decadence of Islam
13 For an overview of the rhetoric opposing the West to Islam, see Arkoun, Mohammed e Maïla, Joseph, De
Manhattan à Baghdad, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 2003.
14 Nissim Rejwan, Arabs face the modern world: religious, cultural, and political responses to the West,
Gainesville, Univ. Press of Florida, 1998.
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from long ago, explaining it through Western domination and advocating a return to the
pristine principles of Islam. Modernists try to integrate Western political and juridical
thought and repudiate the Islamic heritage, with scarce success. Authoritarian leaders
practice politics – and business – as usual; make your regime predictable and functional.
A new and emerging voice in these debates – reformism – demands a complete overhaul
of the formulations of Islamic politics and law15.
On the other hand, the Mediterranean dialogue is plagued by Western qui pro quos.
According to Western culturalism, the failure of the Islamic world to modernize and
democratise is due to wrong priorities: putting faith over reason, community over the
individual, the Muslims above the non-Muslims and allowing a lack of distinction between
public and private, politics and religion. The communitarian characteristics of Islam
and its submission to God – the core of Islam as a religion and a socio-political order –
would inhibit progress and individual initiative16. Now, it is intellectually hopeless
and politically unacceptable to adopt in the 21st century a stance towards Islam
already repelled by European intelligentsia in the 13th century17.
A troubling issue is American exceptionalism, t.i., the US’s perception of itself as being
at the end of history, and at the centre of the West. Arbitrarily capitalizing on its
undisputed leading rank in the military, economic and technological fields, American
exceptionalism legitimates preventive war and interventionism18. It does not attain the
15 As two major examples, see Abdolkarim Soroush, namely The Hermeneutical Expansion and Contraction
of the Theory of Shari’ah; and Mahmoud Mohamed Taha’s The Second Message of Islam. Soroush (1945-)
has been called “The Luther of Islam” (Robin Wright, Journal of Democracy, January, 1996). The sudanese
Taha (1915-1985) was founder of the Republican Brotherhood, in Sudan; he was publicly executed by order
of President Numayry.
16 The best-known proponent of culturalism is Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign
Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993); The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1996. The same culturalist equivoque also comes out in the writings of the once Marxist
Ernest Gellner: “Muslim societies in the modern world present a picture which is virtually a mirror image
of Marxist ones. They are suffused with faith, indeed they suffer from a plethora of it….” Ernest Gellner,
“Civil Society in Historical Context”, International Social Science Journal 43, no. 3 (1991): 133.
17 How parochial is such a vision is enhanced by the contrasting position of XIIIth century European political
thinkers and leaders, such as Thomas Aquinas and Friedrich II Hohenstaufen, who addressed the Muslim
world in plain rational and realistic power terms, as they were aware of the leading role of reason and law
in Islam.
18 Exceptionalism is a cultural and political trend not a Government issue. See What We’re Fighting For: A
Letter from America, (c) February 2002, Institute for American Values, signed by personalities such as Jean
Bethke Elshtain, Amitai Etzioni, Francis Fukuyama, William A. Galston, Mary Ann Glendon, Samuel
Huntington, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Michael Novak, Robert D. Putnam, Michael Walzer, George Weigel,
James Q. Wilson. The letter from America originated several responses in Europe and Middle East.
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level of a post-modern paradigm of governance that America helped to foster since 1945.
A leading sociologist recently described “bowling alone” as the American civil society’s
malaise; consensus is now building that the USA should not “bowl alone” in the arena
of international relations. “Habits of the heart” was identified some 20 years as a major
plus of American civil society; something parallel is needed for its international agenda19.
European occasional xenophobia, namely islamophobia and anti-semitism, is also an
issue. Europe frequently fails to appreciate the perverse consequences of its own phobias
and faulty internal policies. The recent French “banning of the veil” is only the tip of this
iceberg as European countries experience difficulties to integrate migrants that pay taxes
but do not have representation nor participate in the mainstream civic and political
activities. Indeed, much violence directed towards Europe and Southern Mediterranean
governments stems from the politics of exclusion and resentment. Portugal, a country
trying to integrate around 300.000 people from Austral Africa, 150.000 from Brazil and
some 150.000 from Slavic countries (Ukraine, Moldavia, East Balkans) today struggles with
this significant issue.
NATO’s Mediterranean initiative has kept a low profile, due to several factors. There
is no unanimity within the Alliance about the priority of the dialogue; the awareness is less
strong among Northern countries; the goals of the initiative remain ill-defined; NATO has
its own priorities of enlargement, internal adaptation, partnership with Russia, and Balkan
peacemaking.
NATO suffers from an “image” problem as a Cold War institution; the “dialogue
countries” are unsure of the purpose and usefulness of the initiative; the initiative is
divorced from a broader security and defence agenda in the Mediterranean; most
significantly, the USA remains largely unconcerned with a Mediterranean initiative as it
could interfere with its “Greater Middle East” roadmaps.
The Alliance’s dealings with Southern Mediterranean countries must stand on a
firm ground. Some sources are concerned with a tension, and even a contradiction,
between NATO’s comparative advantage in hard security and the primary interests of
the “dialogue countries” in soft security issues.
Clandestine migration, smuggling of drugs and people and the associated trans-national
problems of organized crime are a current preoccupation of the Mediterranean dialogue
19 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2000. Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton
Habits of the Heart by. 1986. Berkeley, California.
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countries. NATO has a bleak image in many of the dialogue countries. As the USA and
several partners already have bilateral defence cooperation treaties with the Southern
region, the Alliance should concentrate on soft security issues and confidence-building
measures rather than undertaking direct defence and military cooperation with the
dialogue countries. Other sources mention the need to change the focus of attention from
state to people, when talking about security20.
The dilemma between hard security and soft security has a good rationale; as repulsive
terrorist acts show, security issues should not be answered ad hoc and post factum.
Most security problems in international relations arise from disturbances of an
internal nature; and internal policies need to be settled according to “the principles of
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”, t.i., NATO must address the primary
causes of insecurity.
4. Building a consensus around Natural Law
A global approach to security needs to establish preconditions. The renewed interest
in natural law, as a precondition for security derives from a concern to promote agreement
on normative policy standards about state building and international relations21. The
impoverished standards of public law in internal policies, as well as the malfunctions of
governance in the international arena, require the rule of law as a way to preclude both
imperial and parochial policies.
The issue can be variously approached. Massive popular consensus against terrorism
is the prime moral expression of natural law. Individual human life is priceless. Every
victim of terrorism is a testimony to humanity.
As a conceptual tool, natural law envisions the continuum of politics across the real
world of democracy. Its standards to evaluate state building acknowledge the necessity of
authority and freedom. You can get a functional state without civil rights, as for instance
Chile 1973, or the political beginnings of Zimbabwe, Taiwan and Singapore. You may get
20 We should “shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives”
(p. IV). Human Security Now, New York, Commission on Human Security, 2003, by Sadako Ogata, Amartya
Sen, Lakhdar Brahimi, Bronislaw Geremek, and other members of the Commission for Human Security.
21 Heinrich Rommen, The natural Law, Liberty Fund, 1998. See also from the American centre-right political
philosopher Leo Strauss, Natural right and history, Boston, 1977, (1st edition 1950); and from the European
left –centre Blandine Kriegel, État de Droit ou Empire, Paris, Bayard, 2002.
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formal civic rights without civic duties; for instance, in some Eastern Europe countries
political mafias never abandoned power. Beyond internal policy – a functional state
with civic rights and civic duties – you may even agree on rules for common intercourse,
such as carried on between EU countries. International law backed by sanctions and
international power, as enforced by the UN, is sufficient to pacify enfeebled and pariah
states. As long as international law is not backed by supranational power, nothing
deters massive disturbance by “big powers” or “rogue states”. UN deficiencies in
keeping international stability are obvious22. The unique position of the U.S. in
supplying strategic balance through a mix of coercion and deterrence is also obvious23.
 Natural law provides a renewed paradigm to counter massive insecurity and
sustained violence all along the spectrum of politics. The paradox of asymmetrical
threats is that it takes just some hundred fanatics to defy a whole society. Global terrorism
knows about the limitations of the international system. Now, if someone wants to stab
me in the back, I must have intelligence, security and even preventive defence. It is
also advisable to tackle the primary causes of the stabbing and to address the broader
issues that nourish terrorism. The triumph of law-abiding states over “big powers” or
“rogue states” malfunctions depends upon the predominance of the rule of law.
Natural law is a crucial tool in the often hostile and pluralistic public environment,
to which people of all races, cultures, and religions can have access through their
rational capacities; it provides moral standards for the political discourse that everyone
can grasp; it provides a civic grammar for religious and secular interlocutors. As the
Chicago philosopher Leo Strauss noted, if you abandon natural law, cannibalism becomes
a question of taste.
Natural law stands as a secular middle ground for religious and non-religious behaviour
precepts. A contemporary democracy may, indeed, be defined as a secular society that
presupposes the natural rights of its citizens and endeavours to fulfil their prior rights. It
cannot, evidently, be based on revelation, inasmuch as revelation is considered an historical
event to a uniquely elected community.
As revelation was divisive in the beginning of Modern Europe, religious order was
confined to the private sphere. As European nation-states emerged, the issue of natural law
took the form of natural rights. To social contract theorists, human beings originally
22 Back in 1966 Martin Wight argued in “Why is there no International Theory?”, that “political theory is ‘the
theory of the good life’ whereas international theory is residual, a ‘theory of survival’” (Jackson, p.261).
23 Ruth Wedgewood. “International Law Is not Enough to Stop Aggression” New Perspectives Quarterly, Fall
2002, 6 pages.
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endowed with rights assemble to form a political community. Both the conservative and
pessimistic Hobbes, and the rather progressive and optimistic Rousseau have the same
paradigm: human being does not come from society but to it. The task of the state is to
facilitate the exercise of the natural rights. State building and public policy become the
main issues.
External factors such as the policies and actions of Western powers may have hindered
the twin processes of modernization and democratization of the Muslim world. Turkey is
a crucial exception to this rule and Morroco may become another. In the case of Turkey,
the NATO membership and the access’ process to EU helped the country to modernize and
secularise24.
Let me, very summarily, suggest why this secularisation of natural law is crucial for
the dialogue between the West and the Islam, and Israel; why it is a common ground
for both secular and religious people.
The majority of Muslims still hold Shari’a as divine – its moral and pastoral theology
and ethics, its ritualistic recommendations and observance; this psychological barrier is
reinforced by the threat of criminal prosecution for apostasy. An intellectual critique and
a strong campaign in the Muslim educational system and the media is necessary to
overcome this barrier25.
Now, the prime effort of reformist Islamic scholars is to show that Shari’a as public law
is not divine at all; it was constructed by early Muslim jurists, taking Qur’an and Sunna as
a starting point. According to Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, one must distinguish between
the real message of the Islam and conjunctural rules in Revelation (Qura’n) and Tradition
(Sunna). The real message occupies a dominant place in the Suras of the Mecca revelation
about the essence of the faith (the free and responsible human being has been created as
an image of the unique and omnipotent God). In the Medina Suras, the prophet tells men
to organize and manage other men, presenting a better society than contemporary Arabia;
it would be able to take some steps towards a more just society. Taha considers the orders
given to this society as conjunctural, not the accomplishment of a divine order26.
24 As I write this, (Dec,15-16 2004) the European Parliament and the European Council gave their approval to
initiate Turkey’s process of integration in the EU.
25 An exhaustive presentation of these issues in: Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Towards an Islamic reformation;
civil liberties, human rights, and international law, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1996.
26 See Samir min, ¿Hacia una teología islámica de la liberación?, IGLESIA VIVA, Valencia, nº 209, ene-mar
2002, 120-123.
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Koranic moral does not have as its single object the organization of the relationship
between man and the divine: every aspect of human activity is under the scrutiny of
law, alongside the somehow reduced place of religious practices. Thus the Koran
is natural law, because moral sanctions abide inside the individual. The Koran refers
unceasingly to the universality of human reason and feelings to justify its commands.
And it associates to its moral teaching a complete educational system which one cannot
neglect.
The moral of Islam, its rules, precepts, interdicts and commands, do not abolish natural
law nor disavow its inspiration or consequences. Appealing to human conscientiousness,
the Koran nourishes natural law. Moral law is not a constraint. It is by voluntary
acceptance that the divine command can become for the believer a moral obligation:
“the first duty is the faith in the duty” 27.
As this kind of self-critique of Muslim thought develops, the belief-systems,
the exegesis’ traditions, theology and jurisprudence become liberated from dogmatic
constructs. As the time comes for Muslim social groups to acknowledge themselves as
“imagined communities”, they differentiate themselves from mythical images. Islamic
reformists are dealing with topics usually considered as ‘unthinkable’ in the academic
world. The category of revelation in the Qur’an is subjected to a comparative study of
historic, linguistic, cultural and anthropological roots28.
As Islamic populations engage in a secularisation and modernization process, they
must reconcile two apparently incompatible sources of authority: divine will considered as
revealed through the Koran, and democracy perceived as the best political regime.
Absolute secularism will always be rejected. Islamic Fundamentalism is an escapist
political solution. The issue, therefore, is how those who base their behaviour on religious
grounds – the vast majority in Islamic countries – can significantly contribute to a modern
democracy, apart from mere political and economic expediency. The answer lies in the
natural law tradition, and the supervening security it creates. For it is very clear that one
is not required to be a secularist in order to be a participant in the secular space created by
the rule of law.
27 Muhammad Abdallah Draz, La morale coranique, Ar-Risala, 2002.
28 See Mohammed Arkoun. The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, London: Saqi Books and The
Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2002. See also Pour une politique de l’espérance dans l’Union Européenne in
Intercultural dialogue. Dialogue interculturel Proceedings of the Congress held in Brussels in 20-21 March
2002.
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The Muslim Mediterranean world, thus, urgently needs a vocabulary (and a grammar)
to read current political events; its vocabulary to qualify events is submerged in
pseudo-history and myth-ideology29.
The reformist proposals may occur within Shi’a Islam, where there is a close
approximation to formal hierarchy of authority, or in Sunni Islam30. The more the
Islamic and Western definitions of human rights coincide, the more natural law and
its civic values will be established as the common ground of the political secularist
and of the “Religions of the Book”31.
Judaism is also receptive to the idea of natural law. The foundation of the Israeli state and
its acceptance of the San Francisco Charter is its best guarantee. For religious-minded Jews,
whatever role tradition atributes to universal human reason, the Torah and commentators
believe in a universal reality called “creation” . Commitment to Jewish tradition, yet, compels
the assertion that revelation grasps more of the truth of creation than human reason and
natural law could ever know. At first sight, a Jewish believer seems to have only two
options when it comes to natural law; he may affirm natural law and allow Judaism to
be swallowed up by a more universal instance; or he may deny natural law and deal with
all social relations at the level of pure power politics. There is a third option, yet, a
legitimate and operational place in Judaism for natural law; “the Torah is not in heaven”;
Jewish believers are responsible for bringing wisdom forth from it on earth32.
A regards Christianity, natural law plays an essential role in social ethics. Churches
apply variously the insights of Christian moral tradition to pressing issues of domestic
governance and foreign affairs. Ecumenic engagement by Roman Catholics and Protestants
led to an endorsement of natural law. The Concilium Vatican II sustained natural law
against those who deny the existence of transtemporal and transcultural moral goods33.
There may be a ‘credibility problem’ with natural law; a culturalist would attack
it for relativism in national or religious identities; a multiculturalist would dismiss it as
an elimination of particularities. Against these two opposing and self-defeating views,
29 Mohammed Arkoun. The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, London: Saqi Books and The
Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2002.
30 Of particular significance is the work of Nobel peace prizewinner Shirin Ebadi, a human rights lawyer. See
her autobiography in http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/2003/ebadi-bio.html.
31 The Medieval precedent in the Mediterranean area, is the acknowledgement of natural law by Averroes,
Maimonides and Aquinas, t.i., a Muslim, a Jew and a Christian. The Renaissance precedent is Jean Bodin’s
Colloquium Heptaplomeres, (1593) the first treatise on tolerance, presided by Diogo Toralba, the virtual
Portuguese Jew in a meeting of Muslim, Catholic, Baptist, and Pagan citizens.
32 David Novak, Natural Law in Judaism, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
33 See John XXII, Pacem in Terris, IV, p. 47, about the “universal unit of human convivium”.
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natural law emerges as a precious criterion to international law and as a safeguard against
the dislocation of political legitimacy34.
If “good secularisation” allows societies to break out from the confines of religiously
sanctioned political order, a perverse secularization creates societies with no defence
against “political religions” such as Communism and Nazism. That was not so long ago
and not far ago. Germany and Italy, and all Eastern Europe, up to the Urals, became
infected with totalitarianism or political religions that can be rightly called “Western
fundamentalism”. Auschwitz and the Goulag were operated with weapons of mass murder
by order of the state35.
Natural law is a ground for modernization and democratisation; it is a bulwark
against violations of human rights and a guideline to a pluralist society, without
collapsing into the normative graveyard of historical relativism; it upholds the state-building
process; it maintains the balance between civil rights and civil duties without which
no leadership can find support among citizens; it is a foundation for the enforcement
of international law; it is a background to improve the supranational power of
international organizations around the model of the “free world”.
Natural law is not the end of troubles but it helps a lot. The World Bank’s latest
prescriptions for successful economic development and good governance outstand
transparency and accountability as factors to attract the foreign investor and to ensure
successful private sector development. Legitimacy, or the rule-of-law, forms part of the
new package and there is an irresistible tendency, to extend this economic prescription into
the political sphere as well.
5. Short-term perspectives and future studies
Guidelines for a NATO security partnership with the Southern Mediterranean countries
should provide a framework for organising cooperation and strengthen existing bilateral
ties in the Mediterranean.
34 José Manuel Pureza, “Anarquia ou Direito – Reflexões sobre o Direito Internacional em vésperas de uma
guerra ilícita”, comunicação no Instituto Superior Naval de Guerra, Lisboa, 14 de Março 2003.
35 The prime exposer is Eric Voegelin, The political Religions, Missouri University Press, 1997(1st ed. 1938).
More recently see Jean-Claude Monod La querelle de la sécularisation – de Hegel à Blumenberg, Paris, Vrin –
collection Problèmes et controverses (2002).
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These issues should be taken into account:
a) What constitutional principles should be observed to ensure the rule of law as the
standard for state reforming in the Southern Mediterranean countries?
b) What tools already exist or should be set in place to foster cooperation in the region?
c) What institutional arrangements can foster the goals and objectives set forth?
d) How developed is the dialogue among high-ranking public administration, military,
academic and civil society leaders of NATO and Mediterranean countries?
e) How to build human capital through education? The importance of education in the
process of modernization and democratization can never be overemphasized.
A Mediterranean partnership is not an NATO‘s exercise in soft power projection. A
new Mediterranean cooperation process, fostered by NATO and the South Mediterranean
countries should not repeat the mistakes of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(the Barcelona Process). It must not present itself as an exercise in unilateral European
policy-making, in which its Southern Mediterranean partners have little choice but to
acquiesce36. Nor should it be another futile exercise of a “wasted century” for the Muslim
countries, as a recent book put it37. You cannot get democracy instantly; but you can get
proto-democracy if you initiate a citizenship process through dialogue among leaders;
Loya Jirga is like Magna Carta.
Attempts to organise Europe’s southern periphery are not European power projection.
Europe’s own lack of capacity in hard security terms is obvious. Such issues are currently
left to NATO or, in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, to the United States and its
chosen allies. NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and the CSCE/OSCE experience in CBM’s
cannot and should not be mechanically reproduced. To many Arab states CBM’s can be
introduced only after a Middle East peace settlement. Moreover, internal security problems
in the Mediterranean are independent from arms control and confidence-building measures.
NATO is a major historical success. It guaranteed the rebuilding of Western Europe
after WW II; it helped foster the European Union; it helped to bring former European
authoritarian regimes into the democratic family; it launched a security partnership with
Russia, overcoming the end of a bipolar world. Above all, NATO won a war, through
containment, against the Soviet Union and its satellites. Yet, as stated in George Kennan’s
36 Mohamed Kadry Said, Security in the Mediterranean, Lisbon, Nação e Defesa, March 14-15 2001.
37 Jean Lacouture, Ghassan Tueni et Gérard D. Khoury, Un siècle pour rien, Paris, Albin Michel, 2002.
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Long Telegram, the West contained the enemy and contained itself. It did not embark upon
upon an imperial expansion like its former communist adversary.
Evolving from a defence into a defence and security alliance, NATO is keeping “the
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”, backed by military power.
Specific threats are checked by specific dissuasion military capabilities, if necessary carried
out on a case-by-case basis. Si vis pacem, para bellum. NATO’s Mediterranean initiative is
concerned with soft security and confidence-building measures, not defence and military
cooperation; as such it may generate a Mediterranean partnership. Si nolis bellum para
pacem. That could be a new motto for the next step of NATO’s initiative.
